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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES T. GRIFFITH,
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]

vs.

]

Case No. 870208-CA
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND, and or CEDAR CITY COCA
COLA BOTTLING COMPANY,
SECOND INJURY FUND,

]
]
]
]i
]
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]

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,
and/or CEDAR CITY COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PRECEEDINGS
This is an original proceeding seeking review by the Utah
Court of Appeals of an Order of the Industrial Commission of
Utah

which

denied the applicant's

application

for temporary

total disability compensation for the period of May 3, 1985
through December 29, 1985.
This

Court

Commission's

is

Order

authorized
pursuant

35-1-83, Utah Code Annotated.

to

conduct

to .the

a

review

provisions

(1953, as amended)

of

of

the

Section

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The

sole

Industrial

issue

in

Commission

this
of

case
Utah

is

whether

acted

or

not

arbitrarily

the
and

capriciously in denying the Applicant-Appellant temporary total
disability compensation from the Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah for the period of May 3, 1985 through December 29, 1985.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

35-1-65.

U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED.

TEMPORARY DISABILITY -

AMOUNT OF PAYMENTS - STATE AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE DEFINED.
(1)

In case of temporary disability, the employee shall

receive 66 2/3% of that employee's average weekly wages at the
time of the injury so long as such disability is total, but not
more than a maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at
the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of
four such dependent children, not to exceed the average weekly
wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to
exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week.

In no case shall such compensation benefits

exceed 312 weeks

at the rate of

100% of the state

average

weekly wage at the time of the injury over a period of eight
years from the date of the injury.
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In the event a light duty medical release is obtained
prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of recovery, and
when no such light duty employment is available to the employee
from the employer, temporary disability benefits shall continue
to be paid.
(2)

The "state average weekly wage" as referred to in

chapters 1 and 2 of this Title shall be determined by the
commission as follows:

on or about June 1 of each year, the

total wages reported on contribution reports to the department
of employment security under the commission for the preceding
calendar year shall be divided by the average monthly number of
insured

workers

determined

by

dividing

the

total

workers reported for the preceding year by twelve.
annual

wage

thus obtained

rounded

to

for

disease

the

nearest

The state average weekly wage as so determined shall

be used as the basis for computing the maximum
rate

The average

shall be divided by 52, and the

average weekly wage thus determined
dollar.

insured

injuries or disabilities
which

occurred

during

arising
the

compensation

from occupational

twelve-month

period

commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, and any
death resulting therefrom.
35-1-84.
THROUGH

DECEMBER

U.C.A.,
31,

1953,

1987).

AS

AMENDED.

FURNISHING

AND

(EFFECTIVE
CERTIFYING

PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSCRIPT TO SUPREME COURT - POWER OF COURT TO
AFFIRM OR SET ASIDE AWARD - GROUNDS FOR SETTING ASIDE.
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Upon the filing of the action for
shall

direct

the

commission

to

furnish

Supreme Court, within twenty days,

all

review the court

and certify
proceedings

to the
and

the

transcript of evidence taken in the case, and the matter shall
be determined upon the record of the commission as certified by
it.

Upon such review the court may affirm or set aside such

award, but only upon the following grounds:
(1)

That the commission acted without or in excess of

its powers;
(2)

That the findings of fact do not

support the

award.
31-1-85, U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED.
DECEMBER 31, 1987).
FACT

AND

(EFFECTIVE THROUGH

DUTY OF COMMISSION TO MAKE FINDINGS OF

CONCLUSIONS

OF

LAW

-

FILING

-

CONCLUSIVENESS

ON

QUESTION OF FACT - REVIEW - COURT JUDGMENT.
After each formal hearing, it shall be the duty of the
commission to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in
writing and file the same with its secretary.

The findings and

conclusions of the commission on questions of fact

shall be

conclusive and final and shall not be subject to review; such
questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings
and conclusions of the commission.

The commission and every

party to the action or proceeding before the commission shall
have the right to appear in the review proceeding.
hearing the court

shall

enter

judgment

setting aside the award.
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either

Upon the

affirming

or

35-1-88.
AND

PROCEDURE

U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED.

BEFORE

COMMISSION

AND

RULES OF EVIDENCE

HEARING

EXAMINER

-

ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall
be

bound

by

the

usual

common-law

or

evidence, or by any technical or formal

statutory

rules

of

rules or procedure,

other than as herein provided or as adopted by the commission
pursuant

to

this

investigation

in

act.

such

The

manner

commission
as

in

its

may
judgment

make

its

is

best

calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties
and

to

carry

out

justly

the

spirit

of

the

workmen's

compensation act.
The

commission

may

receive

as evidence and use as

proof of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and
relevant including, but not limited to the following:
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open
hearings.
(b)

Reports of attending or examining physicians, or

of pathologists.
(c)

Reports

of

investigators

appointed

by

the

• commission.
(d)

Reports of employers, including copies of time

sheets, book accounts or other records.
(e)

Hospital records in the case of an injured or

diseased employee.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Applicant-Appellant herein has a long history of
injury, both industrial and non-industrial, to both his left
and right ankles.
was filed on

an

While the original Application for Hearing
injury

occurring

in December

of

1983^ at

hearing, and at issue before this Court, is an injury occurring
on April 16, 1985.

Subsequent to the administrative hearing in

this matter, a single member medical panel was convened, and
initially found that while the left ankle problems were all
industrially

related,

industrially related.
that

the

the

right

problem

was

not

Additionally, it was the panel's opinion

Applicant-Appellant

would

temporary total disability beyond
(R.252)

ankle

not

be

entitled

to

any

the date of May 3, 1985.

Objections to the medical panel were filed by the

Applicant-Appellant,

and,

after

a

review

of

the

Applicant-Appellant's objections, the medical panel changed his
opinion indicating in a one-sentence reply that the right ankle
injury

and

industrial.

surgery

for

that

ankle

should

be

considered

Because of the confusion created by the Medical

Panel Report, the Administrative Law Judge contacted counsel
with the request that the issue of temporary total disability
be negotiated.
purposes,

The Workers Compensation Fund, for settlement

offered

to

pay

temporary

total

disability

compensation from the date of surgery, December 30, 1985,

- 6 -

to April 2, 1986, the date the Applicant-Appellant was released
to

return

to

work

Dr. D. Ross McNaught.

by

the

treating

physician,

As there was no basis on which to base

temporary total disability compensation, for the period of May
3, 1985 through December

29, 1985, the Workers

Fund denied liability for this period.

Compensation

Along with the Workers

Compensation Fund's letter dated February 11, 1987 containing
its proposal for settlement, substantial evidence was attached
for

the

Applicant-Appellant's

Applicant-Appellant

refused

this

review.
offer

(R.229-242)
of

settlement

The
and

requested that the Administrative Law Judge rule on the issue
of temporary total disability for this period.

(R.220)

Administrative Law Judge, based upon the evidence

The

submitted,

concluded that the Applicant-Appellant herein was not entitled
to temporary total disability compensation for the period of
May

3,

1985

through

December

29,

1985.

Following

the

Administrative Law Judge's Order denying these benefits, the
Applicant-Appellant
reconsideration

of

asked the Administrative Law Judge for a
her

decision.

(R.256-257)

The

Administrative Law Judge, on April 7, 1987, responded to the
Applicant-Appellant, indicating,
This letter will confirm our conversation of
April 6, 1987. As I indicated at that time,
your letter of March
19, 1987, has been
considered, and I am not inclined to change my
findings with regard to the period of temporary
total disability.
I think it is fairly clear
from the record that your client was not able to
have ankle surgery during that time because he

- 7 -

was stabilizing medically from other problems.
In addition, he had several aggravations of his
ankle problems which were not
industrially
related." (R.260)
Subsequent to the Judge's denial of the request for
reconsideration,

the

Applicant-Appellant

Review with the Industrial Commission.
of the Commission

file, the

Motion

filed

- 8 -

for

After a thorough review
for

unanimously, by the Industrial Commission.
appeal was then filed.

a Motion

Review

was

denied,

(R.273-274)

This

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The general standard of review for this Court in

reviewing

Industrial

Commission's

findings

Commission
will

be

findings

upheld

is

in the

that

absence

the
of

a

showing that the order is arbitrary and capricious.
2.

When reviewing the Commission's

findings

as to

issues of fact, the Commission will be upheld if the findings
are not contrary to the law or the evidence submitted.
3.
such, the

The issue of disability is a matter of fact.
Commission's

determination

of

disability

must

As
be

based upon all of the relevant facts submitted.
4.
by

the

medical

The Administrative Law Judge's Order, as approved

Industrial
evidence

Commission, was
and

other

supported

testimony

by

reviewed

substantial
pursuant

to

Section 35-1-88, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
5.

The

burden

establish disability.

of

proof

is

on

the

Applicant

to

This burden has not been met by the

Applicant-Appellant herein.
6.

In cases where disability is being claimed, the

applicant must prove that the industrial injury is the direct
and proximate cause of the claimed disability.
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ARGUMENT

THE GENERAL STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THIS COURT IN
REVIEWING
INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION
FINDINGS
IS
THAT
THE
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS WILL BE UPHELD IN THE ABSENCE OF A
SHOWING THAT THE ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Blaine v.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 700 P.2d L084, 1086 (Utah 1985),
set forth the standard of review to be used on appeals taken
from

Industrial

Commission

decisions.

The

opinion

states:

This Court's standard of review of the
Commission's records is set forth in U.C.A.,
1953, Section 35-1-84, which provides that the
Court may affirm or set aside an order of the
Commission only upon the following grounds:
(1) That the Commission acted without
or in excess of its powers;
(2) That the findings of the fact do
not support the award.
This Court has interpreted the foregoing
statutory standard on numerous occasions and has
concluded that the Commission's findings are not
to be displaced in the absence of a showing that
they are arbitrary and capricious.
[Footnote
omitted]
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard was reaffirmed
in the case of Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P. 2d
(Utah 1986).

109, 111

In Rushton, the Court held:

On an appeal from a decision by the Commission,
this Court will not disturb the findings and
orders
of
the
Commission
unless
they
are
arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitrary
and capricious when they are contrary to the
evidence or without any reasonable basis in the
evidence.
- 10 -

Because the Administrative

Law Judge's decision was

based on the evidence submitted at the time of hearing, the
decision was not arbitrary and capricious and therefore, should
not be overturned.
ARGUMENT
II
WHEN REVIEWING THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS AS TO ISSUES
OF FACT, THE COMMISSION WILL BE UPHELD IF THE FINDINGS ARE NOT
CONTRARY TO THE LAW OR THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED.
The

determinative

statutes

in

this

regard

contained in Sections 35-1-84 and 35-1-85, U.C.A. 1953.

are
These

statutes were interpreted by the Supreme Court of Utah in the
case of Savage v. Industrial Commission, 565 P. 2d 782 (Utah
1977)

The Savage opinion reads in pertinent part:
A look at appropriate statutes is necessary
to determine whether this court can set aside the
decision and order of the Commission.
Section 35-1-85, U.C.A. 1953, reads:
After each formal hearing, it
shall be the duty of the commission to
make findings of fact and conclusions
of law in writing and file the same
with its secretary. The findings and
conclusions
of
the
Commission
on
questions of fact shall be conclusive
and final and shall not be subject to
review; Such questions of fact shall
include
ultimate
facts
and
the
findings
and
conclusions
of
the
commission. The commission and every
party to the action or proceeding
before the commission shall have the
right
to
appear
in
the
review
proceeding. Upon the hearing the

- 11 -

court
shall
enter
affirming or setting
(Emphas is added.)

judgment
aside the

either
award.

Clearly the court, pursuant to the foregoing
section and in the absence of an obvious abuse of
discretion or under circumstances where the
ruling is contrary to the evidence, does not have
the authority to review findings of fact made by
the Commission, and by implication, has only the
power to consider issues of law dealing with the
commission's decisions.
Id. at 783.
This

review

standard

is

additionally

indicated

in

Section 35-1-84, U.C.A. 1953, and is likewise addressed by the
Savage Court:
Section 35-1-84, U.C.A. 1953, also limits the
review of these matters by the court.
That
section
provides
in
part
as
follows:
. . . upon such review the court may
affirm or set aside such award, but only
upon the following grounds:
(1)

That the commission acted
or in excess of its powers;

without

(2)

That the findings of fact do not
support the award.

Looking at the evidence and the record in
light most favorable to the Commission's
findings, as we are obliged to do, the court
will not interfer with the orders of the
Commission unless it appears contrary to law
or contrary to the evidence. [Emphasis added]
Id. at 783.
It is quite evident from the statutory mandate and the
clear interpretation given by the Supreme Court of Utah, that
the Appellate Court should not overturn Commission orders

- 12 -

absent a finding that the order is contrary to the law or the
evidence submitted.

ARGUMENT
III
THE ISSUE OF DISABILITY IS A MATTER OF FACT. AS SUCH,
THE COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION OF DISABILITY MUST BE BASED UPON
ALL OF THE RELEVANT FACTS SUBMITTED.
In the case of Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Industrial
Commission, of State of Utah, 709 P.2d
Supreme

Court

more

particularly

sets

1168 (Utah 1985), the
forth

the

reviewing

standard in cases where disability is the issue of fact to be
reviewed.

In the Kaiser case, the Supreme Court holds:

While
disability
claims
are
liberally
construed in favor of awarding benefits, Prows v.
Industrial
Commission, Utah,
610 P.2d
1362
(1980), we do not overturn the Commission's
findings on appeal unless they are arbitrary or
capricious, wholly without cause, contrary to the
one inevitable conclusion from the evidence, or
without any substantial evidence to support
them.
Kincheloe v. Coca-cola Bottling Co. of
Odgen, Utah, 656 P.2d 440 (1982); Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. Monfredi, Utah, 631 P.2d 888 (1981).
Id. at 1169.
The Supreme Court in this case indicated that if there
was

any

findings

substantial
as to

evidence

claims

for

to

support

disability,

the

Commission's

the Court would not

overturn the Commission's findings.
Additionally,

in

the

case

of

Shipley

v.

C

Contracting Co., 528 P.2d 153 (Utah 1974), the Supreme Court

- 13 -

&

W

indicates that when considering issues of fact in determining
disability, all witnesses may be considered.

The Shipley court

states:
We have no disagreement with the plaintiff's
argument
that
it
would
be
unjust
and
impermissible for the Commission to obdurately
ignore
clear, credible,
and
uncontradicted
evidence so that its action is arbitrary and
unreasonable. Yet is not necessarily bound to
accept the opinions of any witness or witnesses,
expert
or
otherwise,
as
to
what
its
determination should be.
If it were so, it
should be obvious that this would turn the
prerogative entirely over to the expert witness
and would relieve the Commission of both its
prerogative and its responsibility. This would
be especially true in the case like this where
it would seem that the question as to the degree
of plaintiff's disability, both as to the
percentage and the permanency thereof, and how
it compares to specific disabilities listed in
the statute, is not a problem in mathematics
which can be determined with absolute certainty,
but involves the exercise of some judgment upon
which reasonable minds might vary in their
conclusions. [Footnotes omitted]
Id. at 155.
Section

35-1-88,

Determinative

Statutes

evidence,

addition

in

as

section

reproduced
of

this

above

brief,

in
refers

the
to

to witnesses' testimony, that may be

reviewed by the Administrative Law Judge and the

Industrial

Commission.

The

Rushton

court

interprets

follows:

- 14 -

Section

35-1-88,

as

U.C.A., 1953, Section 35-1-88 permits the
Commission to receive all 'relevant and material
evidence,'
including
Commission-appointed
investigators' reports and attending or examining
physicians'
reports.
U.C.A.,
1953,
Section
35-1-85, requires the Commission to make findings
of fact and provides that those findings are
conclusive.
Moreover, decisions from the Court
have repeatedly reaffirmed the fact-finding role
of the Commission and have stated that the
Commission must look at all relevant evidence in
reaching its findings without being restricted to
giving evidence from specific witnesses more
weight than that from other witnesses.
(See
Shipley v. C & W Contracting Co., 528 P.2d 153,
155 (Utah 1974) (the Commission is not necessarily
bound to accept the opinions of any witness or
witnesses, expert or otherwise); Mollerup Van
Lines v. Adams, 16 Utah P.2d 235, 240, 398 P.2d
882, 885 (1965) (the Commission had both the
prerogative and duty to view the entire testimony
of the medical panel doctor and believe those
statments that impressed it). As the foreoing
authorities
indicate, the Commission
is the
principal fact finder and, as such, may review all
relevant evidence.
Id. at 111, 112.
In I.G.A. Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P. 2d 828

(Utah

1978), the Supreme Court again delineated the responsibility of
the Industrial Commission to review all evidence submitted, and
from that, to draw conclusions which are fairly and reasonably
derived from the facts.

In the Martin case, the Court states:

. . . in so discharging its responsiblity, it
was the prerogative and the duty
of
the
Commission to consider not only the report of the
medical panel, but also all of the other evidence
and to draw whatever inferences and deductions
fairly and reasonably could be derived therefrom.
Id. at 830.

- 15 -

It is apparent from the above referenced cases that
the

directive

Commission

of

from

the

Supreme

Court

to

Utah has been to evaluate

the

Industrial

all of the facts,

whether medical or otherwise, in making a final determination
as to the issue of fact concerning disability.

ARGUMENT
IV
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S ORDER, AS APPROVED BY
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL MEDICAL
EVIDENCE AND OTHER TESTIMONY REVIEWED PURSUANT TO SECTION
35-1-88, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED.
Before

establishing

that

there

was

substantial

evidence supporting the Administrative Law Judge's Order and
the Commission's affirmation, the facts as set forth by the
Applicant-Appellant

must

be

reviewed.

On

page

6

of

the

Applicant-Appellant's brief, the first paragraph reviews a few
of the injuries documented for the Applicant-Appellant.

The

brief does, however, leave out a number of additional injuries
which are documented

in the record.

sustained an injury to his

The Applicant-Appellant

left ankle

in December

of 1978,

another in March of 1979, and a sprain to his right ankle on
March 12, 1984.

(R.250, 164)

oment

panel

of

dical

in

the

The reference to the reports
middle

of

page

7

of

the

Applicant-Appellant's brief should refer to the record at page
203, 204, and 219 rather than the indication that the medical
panel was additionally evidenced on page 214.
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The

Defendants-Respondents

the Applicant-Appellant's

take

strong

exception to

indications beginning on the bottom

of page 7 of the Applicant-Appellant' s brief that there were
"lengthy

attempts

at

treating

the Applicant-Appellant

in

conservative fashion without having to resort to surgery."

a

For

this proposition, the Applicant-Appellant refers to the record
at page 226.

The letter contained on page 226 says nothing

whatsoever of conservative care.
the

concern

with

the

Rather, it directly refers to

Applicant-Appellant's

other

"severe

medical problems" which had caused a cardiac arrest with the
same surgery on the opposite ankle.
is

alleged

that

hypertension

stabilization

must

be

of

achieved

222.

Page

222

the

Applicant-Appellant's

before

allegation, the Applicant-Appellant
page

Continuing on page 8, it

contains

surgery.

For

refers to the
a

letter

this

record
from

at
the

Applicant-Appellant stating:
It is our position that Mr. Griffith could not be
treated surgically as he was on December 30,
1985, until Dr. Alfaro was able to bring his
blood pressure within acceptable limits. (R.222)
While

the

Defendants-Respondents

would

admit

that

hypertension was one of the concerns considered before surgery,
a

letter

position

directly
of

from

the

Applicant-Ape11ant

the Applicant-Appellant

will

hardly

stating
support

the
an

allegation of medical fact.
In the

first

complete

paragraph

Applicant-Appellant's brief, it is indicated:
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of

page 8 of the

The conservative treatment as attempted by
Dr. McNaught did not successfully treat the
Applicant-Appellant's
injury
and
once
his
hypertension
was
stabilized,
surgery
was
performed on December 30, 1985. (R.252)
The
Judge's

Defendants-Respondents

findings

do

would

indicate

admit

that

that

the

once

the

Applicant-Appellant's other conditions had stabilized, surgery
was

performed.

alleges

a

However,

conservative

once

again

treatment

the

Applicant-Appellant

program

which

is

neither

supported by the Judge's findings contained in the record from
249 through 255, nor

is it supported

anywhere else

in the

record.
The facts of the case as included in the record are
subtantially

different

from

Applicant-Appellant's brief.

those

contained

in

the

The facts contained in the record

support the fact that the Administrative Law Judge's Order, as
affirmed by the entire Commission, was based

on

substantial

evidence.
Regarding the claimed injury of April 16, 1985, the
records

would

indicate

that

the Applicant-Appellant's

visit for medical treatment was on April 16, 1985.

first

That record

indicates:
Examination shows mild swelling of the ankle,
both laterally and medially with associated
tenderness and a limited range of motion, but is
clinically stable. X-rays at Valley View Medical
Center showed no evidence of fracture. The ankle
has been braced and he will be off work for at
least one week and will be checked in the office
at that time. (R.119, Addendum p. 1) [Emphasis
added]
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The x-rays, taken also on April 16, 1985, the date of
the alleged injury, indicate a history of frequent sprains and
twists.

(R.

injuries

prior

120)

The

to

April

record
16,

also

1985.

documents
(R.47,

additional

48,

164)

The

Applicant-Appellant by his own testimony reports intermittent
problems with both ankles prior to 1981.
1985,

the

treating

Applicant-Appellant

physician

is' "clinically

(R.81)

indicates
stable".

On April 16,
that

the

The doctor

also

indicates that the Applicant-Appellant would be off work for at
least one week, after which his condition would be rechecked.
(R.119)
The next visit appears to be on May 2, 1985.
Addendum p. 2)

(R.118

The letter written by Dr. McNaught to the State

Insurance Fund (Workers Compensation Fund) on May 2 indicates,
"A history of having rather severe sprains of both ankles."

In

regards to the right ankle injury, Dr. McNaught records:
When examined today, the symptoms have settled
down nicely with a good range of motion and no
pain or
swelling
and
the
ankle
has
been
immobilized in a brace. He informed me at this
time that they had given away his job at the Coca
Cola Company and have advised retraining.
After our conversation today, I think that
retraining would be indicated in this individual
to try to get him into some type of lighter work
that he will able to continue at for an extended
period of time. (R.118, Addendum p. 2)
The medical evidence available to the Administrative
Law Judge would indicate a history of severe sprains of both
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ankles, (R.118), radiological evidence of frequent sprains and
twists of the right ankle as indicated on the date of injury,
(R.120),

and

a

finding

of

clinical

stability.

(R.119)

Additionally, Dr. McNaught indicates on May 2, 1985 that the
Applicant-Appellant had no pain, no swelling, and a good range
of

motion.

(R.118)

It

is

also

noted

that

the

Applicant-Appellant had lost his job and had been advised by
his physician to obtain retraining.

A

recommendation to be

retrained in a lighter type of work is highly indicative of a
stabilized condition.

Very few physicians recommend retraining

while an injured employee is still in the healing process.

The

Applicant-Appellant discontinued his physical therapy as of May
1, 1985, (R.211) and there was no indication in the doctor's
letter

of

necessary.

May

2,

There

is

1985,
also

that
no

a

return

evidence

of

appointment
a

change

was

in the

Applicant-Appellant's ankle condition between May 2, 1985 and
December

30, 1985, again, indicating medical

Applicant-Appellant
instability.
surgically
ankle.

(R.105)
treated

suffered
This
on

from

same

the

stability.

chronic

condition

had

The

ligamentous
already

Applicant-Appellant's

been

opposite

This is supported in the record as indicated above.
As

of

May

2,

1985,

the

Applicant-Appellant

had

recovered from the temporary aggravation of April 16, 1985 as
indicated by the doctor's note that the Applicant-Appellant had
no pain, no swelling, and a good range of motion.

(R.118)

The

Judge found that subsequent to Dr. McNaught's letter of May 2,
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1985, the Applicant-Appellant
1985,

and

again

situations.

in

June

(R.251).

re-injured the ankle in May of

of

1985,

The

Judge

both

in

non-industrial

also

notes

that

the

Applicant-Appellant went on a family trip to Chicago in June of
1985.

(R.251,

252)

This

was

substantiated

by

the

Applicant-Appellant's own testimony at pages 61, 63, 90, and 91
of the Court's record.
several
(R.252)

other

The Administrative Law Judge also found

non-industrial

aggravations

during

that time.

These aggravations were supported medically at page

115 of the Court's record.
The

Applicant-Appellant's

brief

alleges

that

Dr. McNaught was attempting conservative treatment during this
period.

There

record.

Indeed, the record would reflect that there was no

actual

is

treatment

through

August

no

for
14,

support

over
1985.

actually recommended,

for

this

allegation

three months, from
If

conservative

May

in

2,

the

1985

treatment

were

it would be reasonable to assume that

there would be some actual "treatment" involved.

Indeed, the

treatment rendered on and after August 14, 1985 involved only
the Applicant-Appellant's non-related medical problems.
is

no

treatment

right ankle.

specifically

for

the

There

Applicant-Appellant's

The last time that the Applicant-Appellant was

seen for the April 16, 1985 aggravation was May 2, 1985 at
which

time no

further

treatment, other

than

a

brace,

recommended, and no further office visits were scheduled.

was
Even

the plaintiff himself was aware that he had been released from
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treatment

in

the

Applicant-Appellant's testimony at page 92 of the record.

When

the

by

Dr. McNaught.

Applicant-Appellant

was

This

is

evidenced

questioned

about

a

hospital

admission in October of 1985, the Applicant-Appellant responds,
Q.

Could you have been admitted in the Dixie
Medical Center in October of '85?

A.

No.
Mr. Shumate:

Just last October.

A.

No.
Unless it - - Well, I can vaguely
remember
Dr. McNaught
saying
after he
released me that he wanted to see me in a
couple of months. Just to do a follow-up.
So it could be Valley View. Is just - - .
[Emphasis
added]

It

is

apparent

by

this

entry

that

even

the

Applicant-Appellant was aware that he had been released from
Dr. McNaught*s treatment.
The Applicant-Appellant refers to the case of Booms v.
Rapp Construction Company, 720 P. 2d 1363 (Utah 1986) for the
proposition that "stabilization is strictly a medical question
that

is

appropriately

evidence."

decided

(Applicant-Appellant's

on

the

brief

basis
at

page

of

medical

10-11)

As

indicated above, the Judge had substantial medical evidence to
support her position.

The Booms case, however, also indicates

that subsequent to the review of medical evidence, the Judge is
the finder of fact and, as such, can make the decision as to
disability.

In Booms, there was a conflict between the medical

evidence presented.

The Court in that case concluded:
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The administrative law judge is the finder of
fact. The discrepancy between Dr. Tedrow's rating
of
10
percent
psychological
impairment
and
Dr. Egan's rating of 20 percent impairment was
simply a conflict between expert witnesses.
In
such a case, the administrative law judge properly
exercised his authority to decide the question
after reviewing the evidence from both sides.
Id. at 1367.
It is the duty of the Administrative

Law Judge to

review the evidence submitted and draw a reasonable conclusion
from

said

evidence.

As

referenced

above, Section

35-1-88,

U.C.A. 1953, directs the Commission to receive as evidence and
use as proof on any fact in dispute, " . . .

all

evidence

deemed material and relevant . . . ."
The

Applicant-Appellant

points

out

that

the

Applicant-Appellant did not work during the period from May 3,
1985 to December 30, 1985.
Applicant-Appellant

However, the record shows that the

lost his job some time

(R.lll, 118, Addendum p. 2)

in May of 1985.

Referring again to the Booms case,

the Court held:
Once a claimant reaches medical stabilization,
the claimant is moved from temporary to permanent
status and .he is no longer eligible for temporary
benefits. Thus, the statutes imply that at some
point a claimant's disability ceases to be
temporary and should be recognized as permanent.
To accept the claimant's argument would require
that all claimants who are unable to return to
their prior employment would receive temporary
total benefits for the entire 312-week statutory
period.
That result is inconsistent with a
statutory structure which provides for both
temporary and permanent benefits.
Id. at 1366, 1367.
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As the Booms court indicates, the mere fact that an
injured employee has not returned to his prior employment does
not and cannot stand for the proposition that he is not yet
medically stable.
In the case at hand, the Administrative Law Judge,
after

a thorough

concluded

that

review

of

all

of

the

the Applicant-Appellant

temporary total disability
December 29, 1985.

compensation

evidence
was

not

submitted,
entitled

from May 3,

to

1985 to

This was a direct ruling on an issue of

fact based upon substantial evidence.

Therefore, this decision

should not be overturned.

ARGUMENT
V
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE APPLICANT TO ESTABLISH
DISABILITY.
THIS
BURDEN
HAS
NOT
BEEN
MET
BY
THE
APPLICANT-APPELLANT HEREIN.
The Applicant-Appellant's

Argument

II

alleges that,

"There is no medical evidence to support the claim that the
Applicant-Appellant was not totally disabled from May 3, 1985
through

December

p. 10)

It

disability.

29,

1985."

(Applicant-Appellant's

is the Applicant-Appellant's

Brief

burden to establish

It is not the Defendants-Respondents' burden to

prove that he was not totally disabled.

The Utah State Supreme

Court has directly addressed this issue.

The Shipley decision
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involved a situation wherein the plaintiff was claiming that he
should be declared permanently and totally disabled based on
his lack of employment in a gainful occupation.

The Court in

that case held:
To be considered in connection with the
foregoing is the fact that the burden rests upon
the plaintiff to prove the extent of his
disability by evidence which persuades the
Commission in accordance with his contention.
In that connection, it is to be had in mind that
there was not only the evidence upon which the
plaintiff relies concerning his unemployability,
but also the evidence, which he seems to ignore,
of the medical panel which rated his disability
at 50 percent, which the Commission elected to
believe and adopt as its finding.
It is not
open to question that if the Commission had
chosen to make its findings in accordance with
the plaintiff's evidence, that award would be
sustained. But upon this review, it is our duty
to survey the total evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commission's determination; and
to assume that it believes those aspects of the
evidence which support its award; and we cannot
properly reverse when there is a reasonable
basis therein to support the findings and award
as made. [Footnotes omitted]
Id. at 155.
To
burden

allege

to

that

prove

it is not the Applicant-Appellant' s
his

case,

but

rather

the

Defendants-Respondents' duty to prove that he does not have a
case, is unreasonable.
The Applicant-Appellant concludes Argument II with the
statement

that,

"The

medical

panel

did

not

contradict

Dr. McNaught in its report of December 8, 1986, (R.219)."
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(Applicant-Appellant's

Brief, page

11)

Panel Report contained in the record

The original
at pages

203

Medical
and 204,

indicates,
In answer to question #2 I find very little
evidence in either Dr. McNaught's or any of the
other records that would indicate a causal
connection between the applicant's need for
surgery on December 30, 1985 and the industrial
accident on December 31, 1983 or of April 16,
1985.
I think that his right ankle had several
other injuries that were non-industrially related
and I can find no evidence that this was
industrial in nature.
Therefore, for answer #3, there would be
temporary total disability after May 3rd
1986.

no
of

The Applicant-Appellant then filed an objection to the
Medical Panel Report

containing

indicating that the claims

a

adjuster

letter

from

Dr.

McNaught

for the State Insurance

Fund (Workers Compensation Fund) had indicated that if surgery
was the only alternative, the Fund would accept liability for
the same.

Subsequent to the Panel's review of the objections,

the single member Medical Panel issued a one-sentence reply.
The reply, found in the record at page 219, indicates, "After
review of James L. Shumate's objections and the letter from
Dr. McNaught I would agree that his right ankle is industrially
related

and

should

be

covered

injury to his right ankle."

according

There was no

to

the

further

industrial
directive

from the medical panel regarding temporary total disability.
On February 3, 1987, the Applicant-Appellant wrote to the
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Defendant-Respondent,

Workers

Compensation

Fund,

indicating

that it would be necessary to submit the issue of temporary
total

disability

determination.

to
The

the

Administrative

Applicant-Appellant

medical panel did not make
disability.

a finding

The Applicant-Appellant

Law
was

Judge
aware

for

her

that

the

as to temporary total

asked the Administrative

Law Judge to make a determination on the issue of temporary
total disability.

(R.220 and 221)

When the Administrative Law

Judge found against temporary total disability for the period
of May 3, 1985 to December 29, 1985, the Applicant-Appellant
filed a Motion For Review, which was denied by
Industrial Commission.

the

entire

(R.271 through 274)

The Applicant-Appellant

in this case

failed

to meet

his burden of proof of convincing the Administrative Law Judge
and the Industrial Commission that the Applicant-Appellant was
temporarily

and

totally

disabled

from

May

3,

1985

through

December 29, 1985.

ARGUMENT
VI
IN CASES WHERE DISABILITY IS BEING CLAIMED, THE
APPLICANT MUST PROVE THAT THE INDUSTRIAL INJURY IS THE DIRECT
AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE CLAIMED DISABILITY.
On August

14, 1985, Dr. McNaught

surgery be performed
ankle.

(R.116)

recommended

that

for the repair of Mr. Griffith's right

On August 29, 1985, surgery was approved by
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the

claims

adjuster

for

Compensation Fund).

the

(R.217)

State

Insurance

Before

the

Fund

(Workers

Applicant-Appellant

could undergo surgery, however, he had numerous non-industrial
medical problems which had to be stabilized prior to surgery.
Among
high

these
blood

obesity.

serious,
pressure,

non-related,

medical

hypertension,

conditions

asthma,

were:

alcoholism,

and

(R.110, 111, 112, 113, 129, 131, 132, 133, 138, 152,

153, and 252)

Additionally, the records would tend to indicate

that • the majority of these medical problems were attributable
to

the

actions

of

the

Applicant-Appellant's
Dr. Enrique Alfaro

Applicant-Appellant.

asthmatic

is evidenced

condition,
at page

Regarding
the

the

opinion

of

113 of the record.

Dr. Alfaro indicates, "He does have some shortness of breath
and this is usually
pressure

and

related

tightness

on

to the asthma
his

chest,

as well

but

it

as some

usually

is

associated with him not taking his Marax on a regular basis."
(Emphasis added)
problems
surgery

that
on

Dr. Alfaro also suggests that some of the

the Applicant-Appellant

the

left

ankle

alcoholic myocardiopathy.

may

have

had

during

been

due

the

prior

in part

to

(R.113)

Dr. Kent B. McDonald indicates at p. 131 of the record
that

the

alcohol

Applicant-Appellant's

related."

hypertension

Additionally,

the

doctor

was

"possibly

notes

alcoholic

liver disease, hyperuricemia, obesity, and chronic alcohol use
and abuse.

All of the conditions which prohibited the surgery
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as recommended in August were totally unrelated to the claimed
industrial injury.
The Industrial Commission has held that an industrial
injury must be the direct
disability.

and proximate cause of a claimed

In the recent case of Robert C. Large v. Howard

Trucking of Utah, Inc., Case No. 85000759, (Addendum p. 3-6),
the Commission reviewed
holding
direct

that
and

disability.

the

an administrative

applicant's

proximate

cause

of

industrial
his

law

judge's

order

injury was not the

claimed

permanent

total

In affirming the Administrative Law Judge's Order,

the Industrial Commission of Utah ruled:
The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that
the applicant most likely is unemployable due to
a combination of factors including his age (64),
obesity, lack of transferable skills, prior back
surgery and the aggravation caused by the March
25, 1985 incident. However, the Administrative
Law Judge states that the statute dealing with
permanent
total
disability
benefits, U.C.A.
35-1-67, contains language that implies that the
industrial injury giving rise to the permanent
total disability must be the proximate or
dominant
cause
of
the
permanent
total
disability.
The Administrative Law Judge notes that U.C.A.
35-1-67 begins with the phrase 'in cases of
permanent total disability.'
He states this
phrase is best interpreted to mean ' in cases of
industrial injury resulting in, or causing,
permanent
total
disability.'
Therefore,
according
to
this
line
of
reasoning, the
Administrative Law Judge states it is implied
that the industrial injury must be the proximate
or dominate (sic) cause of the permanent total
disability. (Addendum p. 3-4)
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The Commission concludes:
The Commission must agree with the Administrative
Law Judge that U.C.A. 35-1-67 implies there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the
permanent total disability. The Commission finds
it is logical to presume that the Legislature
intended permanent total disability benefits for
those employees whose disabilities result due to
an industrial injury and not due to a long list
of other factors. The concept of proximate cause
serves the purpose of allowing those whose
disabilities
are
truly
the
result
of
the
industrial injury to be properly compensation
(sic).
That concept may also eliminate some
industrially injured individuals from permanent
total disability compensation, but will not
eliminate those individuals for other kinds of
workers' compensation benefits.
This result
seems both logical and fair to the Commission and
therefore
the
Commission
must
affirm
the
Administrative Law Judge's
adoption
of
the
proximate cause theory as it applies to U.C.A,
35-1-67. (Addendum p. 4)
While the Defendants-Respondents acknowledge that this
particular case was relating to a permanent total disability
claim and the present claim is for temporary total disability,
the basis for the theory is the same.

An industrial insurance

carrier should not be required to compensate claimants whose
claimed disability is not caused by the industrial injury.

It

is obvious in the record, that the delay from the time that
surgery

was

actually

recommended

to

the

time

surgery

performed, was not caused by the industrial injury.
the

Administrative

temporary

total

Law

Judge

disability

was

correct

compensation

Applie ant-Appe11ant.
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as

in

was

As such,

disallowing

claimed

by

the

CONCLUSION
In the case of Entwistle Co. v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495,
498 (Utah 1981), the Supreme Court held,

"The extent and the

duration of an employee's disability are questions of fact to
be determined by the Commission,

We review the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Commission's

findings, and when

there is substantial evidence to support the facts as found by
the Commission, its order will not be disturbed."
omitted]

[Footnote

The Defendants-Respondents respectfully request that

the Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as affirmed by the
Industrial Commission, which was based on substantial medical
evidence and other

evidence

including

the

testimony

of

Applicant-Appellant, be affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

the
We

would request that the Applicant-Appellant's claim for benefits
in addition to those awarded, be denied.
Respectfully submitted, this 21st day of September, 1987.

ikteg^''-^
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents,
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
and/or Cedar City Coca Cola Bottling Co.
560 South Third East
P.O. Box 45420
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0420
Telephone: (801) 533-7842
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENTS, to
James L. Shumate, 110 No. Main, Suite H, P.O. Box 623, Cedar
City, Utah 84720, Erie Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury
Fund, P.O. Box 45580, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and
Earl Dorius, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 8415, this 21st of September, 1987, first
class postage prepaid.

afe^^
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ADDENDUM

Page
1.

April 16, 1985 Office Consultation, Dr. D.R. McNaught

1

2.

McNaught letter of May 2, 1985

2

3.

Industrial Commission's Order Denying Motion For Review Robert C. Large v. Howard Trucking Case No. 85000759
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3-6

OFFICE CONSULTATION
NAME:
DATE:

Dr. D. R. McNaugNt

James T. Griffith
4-16-85

History: This man has had recurrent ankle sprains secondary to work injuries at Coca
Cola Bottling Company. The left ankle became so severe that it was treated surgically
with a ligament repair. He has been back to work without any difficulty to the left
ankle. Yesterday he turned over the right ankle while at work. He has had increased
pain and swelling in the region of the right ankle overnight and today is unable to
weight bear and is on crutches. Examination slows mild swelling of the ankle, both
laterally and medially with associated tenderness and a limited range of motion, but
is clinically stable. X-rays at Valley View Medical Center showed no evidence of
fracture. The ankle has been braced and he will be off work for at least one week and
will be checked in the office at that time.
4-16-85
4-18-85
DRMrjdh
Dictated - not edited
cc:

State Industrial Commission
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84110
State Insurance Fund
P.O. Box 45420
Salt Lake City, Utah
33-25457-B6

84145-0420

Addendum 1

VALI-LT VIKW M E D I C A L
595

S O U T H 75

CENTER

EA«T

C I D A H U I T V , U T A H K«7IO

^one 586-6962

May 2, 19 S5

Lee Willis, Claims Adjuster
State Insuranre Fund
P.O. Box 45420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0420
RE: Janes Griffith
State Industrial //83-25457-B6
Dear Mr, Willis:
This is a letter in follow-up to our conversation that we had on May 2,
1985 with regards to James Griffith.
This man, who has been employed by Coca Cola Company in Cedar City, gives
a history of having rather severe sprains of both ankles. He was unable to
continue working so we elected to carry out a surgical repair of the
left ankle.
This was complicated initially by a cardiac arrest at the time of surgery,
presumably complicated by his marked hypertension despite his age of 27.
He has also'sprained his right ankle. He has made a good recovery from the
left ankle and was able to return to work without difficulty. He presented
in the office April 16, 1985; and again injured his right ankle with pain and
swelling. X-ray showed no evidence of fracture.
The ankle was brace and he was off physical therapy. When examined today,
the symptoms have settled down nicely with a good range of motion and no pain or
swelling and the ankle has been immobilized in a brace. He informed me at this
time that they have given away his job at the Coca Cola Company and have advised
retraining.
After our conversation today, 1 think that retraining would be indicated in this
individual to try to get him into some type of lighter work that he will be able
to continue at for an extended period of time. Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely ,

Dr. D. R. McNaught
3RM/r,d
inctateci - not edited

Addendum 2

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No:

85000759

*

ROBERT C. LARGE,

*
*

Applicant,

*
*

vs.
HOWARD TRUCKING OF UTAH, INC. and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH and
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendants.

*

ORDER DENYING

*
*
*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*
*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On September 3, 1986, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding the
applicant in the above-captioned case temporary total compensation, permanent
partial impairment and medical expenses related to an incident occurring on
March 25, 1985. The incident involved the applicant's fall from a ladder
affixed to a semi-truck. At the time of the fall, the applicant was in the
process of completing a driving test which he was required to pass before
being hired by the defendant. As such, he had not been officially hired by
the defendant/employer at the time of the injury. The Administrative Law
Judge found that the purposes of workers* compensation were served by
extending coverage to the applicant even though he was technically a
non-employee.
On April 17 f 1987, counsel for the applicant filed a Request for
Hearing for determination of the applicant's permanent total disability. No
hearing was scheduled and the Administrative Law Judge issued Supplemental
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on July 28, 1987. In that
Order, the Administrative Law Judge denies permanent total disability
benefits. The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that the applicant most
likely is unemployable due to a combination of factors including his age (64),
obesity, lack of transferable skills, prior back surgery and the aggravation
caused by the March 25, 1985 incident. However, the Administrative Law Judge
states that the statute dealing with permanent total disability benefits,
U.C.A. 35-1-67, contains language that implies that the industrial injury
giving rise to the permanent total disability must be the proximate or
dominant cause of the permanent total disability.
The Administrative Law Judge notes that U.C.A. 35-1-6 7 begins with
the phrase "in cases of permanent total disability." He states this phrase is
best interpreted to mean "in cases of industrial injury resulting in, or
causing, permanent total disability." Therefore, according to this line of
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reasoning, the Administrative Law Judge states it is implied that the
industrial injury must be the proximate or dominate cause of the permanent
total disability. In the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge finds the
industrial injury is the immediate cause of the permanent total disability or
the cause closest in time to the result. However, the Administrative Law
Judge finds the industrial injury is not the proximate or dominant cause of
the applicant's permanent . total disability.
The Administrative Law Judge
finds the industrial injury adds little to the applicant's overall
non-employability.
Because the injury was the proximate cause of temporary
total disability, medical expenses and some permanent partial impairment, the
Administrative Law Judge found those benefits payable but denied an award of
permanent total disability.
On August 12, 1987, pursuant to U.C.A.
35-1-82.53, counsel for the applicant filed a 1 line Motion for Review. That
Motion for Review simply states that the definition of employee is the same
for permanent total disability as it is for other workers compensation
benefits. The Commission takes this to mean that counsel for the applicant
feels that if temporary benefits are awarded because the applicant is deemed
to have been an employee even though the facts technically show him to have
been a non-employee, then permanent total benefits should be awarded on that
same theory if the applicant qualifies for those benefits.
The Commission finds the only issue on review is whether the
applicant is entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The issue
regarding what kind of causal connection there must be between the industrial
injury and the permanent total disability has not been addressed to date by
the Commission. What causes impairment is a question that is easier to answer
by reference to a medical opinion. What causes disability on a permanent
basis is not so easily pinpointed.
The Commission must agree with the
Administrative Law Judge that U.C.A. 35-1-67 implies there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the permanent total disability.
The
Commission finds it is logical to presume that the Legislature intended
permanent total disability benefits for those employees whose disabilities
result due to an industrial injury and not due to a long list of other
factors. The concept of proximate cause serves the purpose of allowing those
whose disabilities are truly the result of the industrial injury to be
properly compensation.
That concept may also eliminate some industrially
injured individuals from permanent total disability compensation, but will not
eliminate those individuals for other kinds of workers compensation benefits.
This result seems both logical and fair to the Commission and therefore the
Commisison must affirm the Administrative Law Judge's adoption of the
proximate cause theory as it applies to U.C.A. 35-1-67. As result, the
Commission must deny the applicant's Motion for Review.
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ORDER:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's August 12, 1987 Motion
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's July 28, 1987
Supplemental Order is hereby affirmed and final with further appeal to the
Court of Appeals only pursuant to U-C.A. 35-1-83.

Addendum 5

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on September
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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of ROBERT C. LARGE was mailed to
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Robert C. Large
2605 West Van Buren, Space C-42
Phoenix, AZ 85009
Jack C. Helgesen
Attorney at Law
2650 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84401
Elliot Morris
Attorney at Law
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
P.O. Box 45420
SLC, UT 84145-0420
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge
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